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The Supremacy of the Executive
Elitist Politics in Indonesia’s 
Decentralized Reality1
There are several factors that contribute to make Indonesia’s 
local politics elitist—from the transfer of great authority to the 
smallest of the subnational entities, to the fact that Indonesia’s 
model of territorial organization is a subsidized one. Taking into 
consideration the lack of institutionalization of the Indonesian 
political parties on the local level, as well as the elements that 
contribute to the weakening of the local legislatives, this paper 
will explain how the Indonesian decentralization process 
has resulted in a model that situates the local executives 
in a supremacist position, paving the way for local elites to 
hegemonize and control the local political processes.
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INTRODUCTION
In an interview conducted with Ryaas Rasyid, member of the 
famous Tim Tujuh2 and mastermind of the Law Nº 22/1999 on the 
government of the regions, Rasyid (2010) said that the decentralization 
process initiated with the transition towards democracy, after the fall 
of Suharto’s New Order, was supposed to be “more technical than 
political.” !e Law Nº 22/1999 de"ned a decentralization model 
oriented towards the improvement of the basic services o#ered by the 
State. In Rasyid’s words, “the basic idea was to give the regions money, 
authority and total responsibility.” While it is true that in the main 
idea behind the regulation there is part of the basic principle that lies 
behind every decentralization process—bringing the State closer to the 
people—its lack of a more political dimension, which continues today 
despite several reviews, made the Indonesian model of decentralization 
a system that fails to involve the citizenship into the political process, 
leaving it in the hands of the correspondent local elites.
!ere are several factors that contribute to make Indonesia’s local 
politics elitist—from the transfer of great authority to the smallest of 
the subnational entities, to the fact that Indonesia’s model of territorial 
organization is a subsidized one. Taking into consideration the lack 
of institutionalization of the Indonesian political parties on the 
local level, as well as the elements that contribute to the weakening 
of the local legislatives, this paper will explain how the Indonesian 
decentralization process has resulted in a model that situates the local 
executives in a supremacist position, paving the way for local elites to 
hegemonize and control the local political processes.
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF INDONESIA’S 
DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS
As we mentioned in the beginning, Law Nº 22/1999 on the 
government of the regions was the law that established the foundations 
of Indonesia’s decentralization. Subsequent legal reviews and reforms 
on the topic have always had it as their legal reference. !us, it is 
important to pay special attention to it in order to understand the way 
the Indonesian State is territorially structured.
!e "rst thing to take into consideration about the Law Nº 
22/1999 is that the Indonesian lawmakers decided to transfer great 
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authority to the regencies and municipalities, skipping the provinces. 
!e argument behind this decision was that the former were the levels 
of the State administration situated closer to the citizenship—however, 
there is another political motivation behind it. !e decentralization 
not only had to contribute to the better distribution of services, but it 
also had to become the instrument that had to guarantee the “Unity 
of the State,” one of the principles of the Indonesian State philosophy, 
the Pancasila. In a period of great instability, as it normally is in a 
political transition, the legislators in charge of “designing” the new 
Indonesian State were worried that if they gave too much power to 
such big territorial entities as the provinces, those who had traditionally 
demanded greater autonomy (mainly Aceh and Papua) would take the 
slightest opportunity to threaten the unity of the State.3
So within the framework established by the Law Nº 22/1999, the 
provinces had very limited authority and their functions were reduced 
to the following: to mediate con"ict between regencies, to promote 
the regencies’ and municipalities’ development, and to represent the 
central government in the region (Bünte 2009, 107). On the other 
hand, Jakarta transferred to the regencies and municipalities the 
authority in all government #elds, except for the following: foreign 
policy, defense, security, monetary policy, legal system, and religious 
a$airs, all of which were exclusive of the central government.
!e Law Nº 22/1999 also established the institutional structure 
and the mechanisms to elect the provincial and local governments. 
Both regional administrations followed the structure and the 
mechanisms of the national level at that time, and they consisted of 
a regional parliament (DPRD I in the provinces, and DPRD II in 
the regencies and municipalities) that was elected by the citizens, and 
afterwards this same parliament elected the regional executive head, the 
governor in the provinces, and the Bupati or the Walikota in regencies 
and municipalities, respectively. !is electoral mechanism presented 
a great amount of problems not only for the everyday functioning 
of the new system, but also because it led to new forms of extortion 
and corruptive practices. !is, together with the lack of preparation of 
the politicians and bureaucrats on both levels (national and regional), 
made the correct implementation of the process a very chaotic task, to 
the extent that some of the problems then are still present today.
Because the #rst decentralization law had generated such 
implementation problems and was constantly questioned, in the 
last days of her administration, Megawati Sukarnoputri, who wasn’t 
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herself much of a “decentralizer,” passed the Law Nº 32/2004 on the 
government of the regions. !is new legislation followed the president’s 
thoughts on decentralization and, in many ways, went in the opposite 
direction of the previous law. Although it kept decentralization as an 
essential tool for democratization, it con"rmed a tendency towards 
re-centralization. !e new law had as its main target to provide the 
central government with the necessary means to intervene directly 
in local political a#airs (Bünte 2009). In this regard, for example, it 
strengthened the role of the governors as coordinators and supervisors 
of the local governments. Moreover, it tried to develop a bit more on 
the competences of each level of the administration, but not with much 
success. Con$icts between administrations still emerge, particularly, 
when they have to do with organizing shared competences. As it is 
mentioned in a UNDP-Indonesia policy paper of May 2009:
The designation of shared areas of responsibilities, including 
mandatory and optional affairs, is actually based on sectorial 
responsibilities, such as public facilities, health, education, 
labor, cooperatives and small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs), and the environment. Little is mentioned on the 
actual governmental functions that need to be done by each 
level of government (UNDP-Indonesia 2009, 8).
With the objective of "xing this situation, President Yudhoyono 
in his "rst administration (2004–2009) passed a Governmental Decree 
(PP 38/2007) in which not only the areas of action where detailed, but 
also the mandatory functions that both provinces and regencies needed 
to carry out. However, as it is said in that same UNDP-Indonesia 
report (2009): “[it] still leave[s] some areas open to interpretation.” 
It is necessary to keep this in mind when we later talk about the 
distribution of resources from the central government to the regions.
!e second interesting factor to take into consideration while 
analyzing Law Nº 32/2004 is that it introduced direct elections of the 
local executive, in the lines of the constitutional changes that had been 
introduced in the 1945 Constitution regarding the presidential election. 
As we mentioned before, the indirect election of the local executive had 
caused certain problems. Mainly, local and regional parliaments used 
their power to threaten and blackmail candidates, expanding “money 
politics” to the provincial and local levels. !e introduction of direct 
elections tried to end these practices. From 2005 onwards, the Bupati 
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and Walikota, as well as the governors, were going to be elected directly 
by the citizenship, increasing vertical accountability between regional 
and local governments and the people. Legislatives saw their powers 
reduced; their capacity to sack the head of their respective executive 
branch was taken from them and, corresponding to the main idea 
behind the law of giving back to the central government the capacity to 
intervene in local a!airs, it was returned to the Home A!airs Ministry, 
which could do it if regional or local chiefs were involved in graft cases 
or threatened security (Schulte-Nordholt and Van Klinken 2007).
So with the passing of the new regulation (Law Nº 32/2004 on the 
government of the regions) the DPRD’s (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
Daerah, or People’s Representatives Regional Council) weakening 
was translated into an strengthening of the local executives, which not 
only saw their power quotas rise, but also enjoyed higher legitimacy 
thanks to the fact that they were elected directly by the citizenship. An 
example of the greater power given to the local executives by the law 
Nº 32/2004 is "scal authority:
Whereas the 1999 Regional Government Law gave 
local assemblies extensive powers vis-à-vis subnational 
governments, Law Nº 32/2004 on Regional Government tilted 
the balance of power in favor of the latter. It strengthened, 
for example, the fiscal authorities of district heads, who were 
empowered to control the financial management of their 
respective territories, to authorize expenditure and to set 
priorities as well as the ceiling of the budget (articles 156 and 
192) (Buehler 2010, 278).
Moreover, the law also gives the local executives the capacity to 
produce legislation together with the local parliament, and allows it 
to intervene in the DPRD’s everyday functioning by authorizing it 
to select and control the public employees that form the parliament’s 
secretariat, the o#ce in charge of preparing the necessary information 
that the members of the local parliament need to control the executive’s 
performance (ibid., 279).
Michael Buehler (2010) tells us that the Law Nº 32/2004 on the 
government of the regions has developed what he calls an “executive 
dominance” that has reduced horizontal accountability in local 
governments. $is hasn’t allowed a “public sphere” to develop because, 
due to certain socio-economic and institutional conditions, local 
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politics in Indonesia are still elitist. He also tells us that it is because of 
this lack of public sphere that public policies on the local level haven’t 
been carried out e!ectively. As much as we agree with Buehler on this, 
in this article we want to focus on the abovementioned “institutional 
conditions” that make Indonesian local politics elitist.
So far, the decentralization legal framework has shown us a winding 
path of reforms and legal adjustments that might continue until it 
"nds its balance within the democratic regime. #e dogmatic status 
of the Negara Kesatuan (Unitary State) among Indonesian politicians 
makes it di$cult to "nd this balance through political development. 
However, as we will see in the following section, the Unitary State 
of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) has decided to be in contact 
with its decentralized reality by the means of funding and subsidies 
distribution.
THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF 
INDONESIA’S DECENTRALIZATION: 
“A SUBSIDIZED DECENTRALIZATION”
#e economic aspects of the Indonesian decentralization have 
strongly conditioned the model and its functioning and, as it happens 
in most of the countries that carry out a similar process, they have 
been the source of a considerable amount of con%icts between levels 
of government. But apart from that, in Indonesia, the "scal element 
of the territorial organization of the political power is one of the 
factors that have mostly contributed to the strengthening of the local 
executives to the detriment of their respective legislatives.
Law Nº 22/1999, the one in charge of shaping the new 
decentralized state, was accompanied by Law Nº 25/1999 on the 
"scal balance between the regional and central governments. #is law, 
as its name states, established the new framework for "scal relations 
between Jakarta, the center, and the now “autonomous” regions. While 
this represented a substantial change if compared to functioning of 
the previous regime, the truth is that the degree of "scal/economic 
autonomy that the law determined wasn’t in accordance with the 
degree of authority and responsibility that had been given to the 
regions, especially to regencies and municipalities. It could be said 
that the political autonomy of the regions was limited by a centralized 
"
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put it, Indonesia’s model of territorial organization of the State is a 
“highly subsidized” one.
With the Law Nº 25/1999, the State had to transfer 25 percent 
of its income (from its net pro!ts) to the regions; 10 percent of that 
quantity would go to the provinces, and the remaining 90 percent 
would go to the regencies and municipalities, which had, and still 
have, the main responsibility in the spending of these resources.4 "is 
way, the transfers from the center continued to be the regions’ main 
source of income, but, the contrary to what happened during the New 
Order years, now they were the ones deciding on what they would 
spend it.
With Sukarnoputri’s reform of Law Nº 22/1999 came the reform 
of the Law Nº 25/1999. So, Law Nº 32/2004 was accompanied by 
Law Nº 33/2004 on the !scal balance between the regional and 
central governments. "is didn’t represent a substantial change in the 
economic relations of the center with the periphery, but it did foresee 
a progressive increase of the State’s net pro!t destined to the regions.
"e !scal framework established by Law Nº 33/2004 determines 
four di#erent income categories for the regions: !rst, “own-source 
revenue, consisting of tax and non-tax revenues”; second, those coming 
from the balancing fund distributed by the central government to 
all the regions (provinces and districts), “consisting of the General 
Allocation Fund (Dana Alokasi Umum, or DAU) grant, the Special 
Allocation Fund (Dana Alokasi Khusus, or DAK) grant, and shared 
taxes and revenues”; third, “loans and other forms of local borrowing”; 
and fourth, “other local revenues” (Eckardt and Shah 2006, 237–38). 
"e second income category represents the districts’ biggest source 
of revenue, mainly because the DAU grant has “accounted for more 
than 60 percent of the total revenue in the past few years” (ibid., 238). 
However, the DAU grant has big limitations for its spending. "e 
formula to calculate it determines the spending capacity of the local 
entities because it takes into consideration two particular aspects: 
on the one hand, a basic allocation to compensate the salary costs of 
the public services; and on the other hand, an equalizing quantity to 
compensate the !scal gap, taking into consideration the !scal capacity 
of the region and its spending needs. According to Eckardt and Shah 
(ibid.), the logics behind the introduction of the salary component are 
not really clear. 
Indonesia is a vast and diverse country, where it seems logical 
to think that some regions will develop slower than others. Because 
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of that, when the central government decided to decentralize the 
administration and the provision of public services to bring them 
closer to the people, it needed to make sure that all the regions had the 
human resources necessary to do so. In fact, Law Nº 25/1999 already 
took that into consideration, and the salary component of the DAU 
was applied. However, what makes it di!erent from the approach of 
Law Nº 33/2004 is that in this late one, the salary component amounts 
to the totality of the local administration wages. "is represents a huge 
limitation because, as Eckardt and Shah (ibid., 241) indicate:
Indeed, in the aggregate, the expenditure side of local 
government budget is dominated by wage costs, which 
account for about half of local government expenditures . . . 
Local budgets in most districts are heavily skewed toward 
operating expenditures, leaving few funds for much-needed 
capital spending.
When it comes to the DAK, these represent around 5 percent 
of the local governments’ budgets,5 and they are targeted to fund 
those projects considered national priorities and/or those that cannot 
be included in the DAU and are of a special need for a particular 
region. Although these allocations can be solicited by the di!erent 
sectorial departments after consulting with the Finance and Home 
A!airs Ministries, it is generally the central government the one 
deciding their destination. Anyway, these DAK represent a very little 
amount if we compare them to the regular sectorial development 
expenditures of the central government,6 which curiously are not part 
of the regional budgets (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah, 
or APBD) and, therefore, they cannot be controlled by the respective 
regional parliaments.7 Regarding this and the object of this article, it 
is interesting to bring up one of the conclusions of Eckardt and Shah’s 
article (ibid., 268):
Central government departments in decentralized sectors 
continue to spend significant funds directly in the regions, 
at least part of them for functions officially assigned to local 
governments. This spending creates accountability problems 
because citizen-customers do not know which level to hold 
accountable for the quality of the service delivery.
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Besides all the accountability problems that this situation presents, 
the di!culties in discerning who the real service provider is have been 
used by some local governments, or more precisely some Bupati and/
or Walikota when facing re-election, to claim certain achievements in 
order to win credibility and popularity among the citizenship, even if 
they aren’t responsible for them. "is, as we will see in the following 
section, makes the position of local executive head very appealing for 
the political parties, because it is from these positions that they can 
build a political program based on the performance of their candidates.
To sum up, in this section we’ve seen that the economic aspects of 
the decentralization have contributed to the strengthening of the local 
executives, mainly because these are given great amounts of resources 
that are not controlled by the local parliaments because they aren’t 
listed in the regional budgets (APBD). Moreover, due to the fact that 
the relationship between the center and the regions is based in the 
#scal aspect and the top-down distribution of subsidies,8 especially 
through the regular development funds which travel directly and 
exclusively via the executive channel, the Bupati and Walikota become 
and indispensable piece for the well-functioning of the territorial 
organization of the State. "ey become the only relevant channel 
through which the regions deal with the center, so in many ways, they 
act as lobbyists in search for resources for their regions, as the many 
kabupaten and kota o!ces spread all over Jakarta show us.
THE LACK OF PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
ON THE LOCAL LEVEL
As we’ve seen at the end of the previous section, the Bupati and Walikota 
positions are extremely important for the political parties. In such a big 
and diverse country as Indonesia, where political parties have to be, by 
law, nation-wide parties, the development of a political program for each 
one of the more than 500 subnational entities represents an arduous task. 
By securing a local executive position, the political parties can develop a 
program based on their candidate’s performance.9 "e most tangible results 
of their candidate’s performance will depend more on the ability of the 
local executive to get resources from the center (the number one spender 
in #xed capital in the regions) than on its true action and management.
But beyond the importance that these executive positions have for 
the parties in terms of the development of a political program, these 
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are also important for the parties’ economic survival. As Idrus Marham 
(2010), Golkar’s Secretary General, explained in an interview:
If we want to be successful in the next legislative and 
presidential elections, before we need to win a lot of Pilkada 
[the direct election of the local executive heads] . . . because 
if we win, we can conduct our program of constant work right 
the way [this program consisted, according to Marham, in 
being active, doing things on all the levels of government so 
the citizenship could see that Golkar was working]. Without 
power, this is impossible . . . opposition parties cannot exist 
in Indonesia . . . How do we do opposition, with Idealism? No. 
Criticizing [the previous government]? We cannot do that 
either because nowadays society tends to pragmatism. In 
stronger words, the people are asking: Can we eat Idealism?
With this statement and what we’ve seen so far about the importance 
of the local executive, not only economically but also politically, we can 
argue that the Pilkada are one of the most important instruments for 
the well-functioning of the Indonesian political system.
In a way, the Pilkada have contributed to improve vertical 
accountability between the citizenship and the local politicians. But 
have they really helped to bring the State closer to the people? 
As Buehler (2010) pointed out, local politics in Indonesia continue 
to be elitist basically because of the laws that regulate the Pilkada. First, 
all the candidates to local executive heads need to have at least a high-
school (sekola lanjutan tingkat atas) degree or equivalent. In Indonesia, 
this leaves a great number of citizens out of the equation, especially in 
rural areas. Second, the costs of participating in an electoral contest are 
very high, even higher for independent candidates, those who decide to 
run without the backing of a political party. Independent candidates can 
run for local executive heads since the approval of the Law Nº 12/2008 
about the second revision of Law Nº 32/2004. However, there’s a great 
di!erence, regarding the costs of the campaign, between these and those 
who run under the banner of one of the national political parties. For 
instance, whoever is interested in running for Bupati as an independent 
needs to present certain number of supporting signatures based on the 
total population of the region they are campaigning (article 59.2A and 
2B of the Law Nº 12/2008 established between 3 to 6.5 percent). "is 
requires a great logistical e!ort, with a high economic cost, that party 
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candidates don’t need to face (article 59.1). Political parties can present 
their own candidates as long as they control 15 percent of the DPRD 
seats. Of course, if a party doesn’t ful!ll this requirement, they can 
always create coalitions to reach that threshold. But we will talk about 
coalitions later. Also, independent candidates need to sign an “electoral 
contract” in which they reassure that they won’t back o" during the 
electoral process (article 59.5a.c), and if they do back o", they will be 
charged 20 million rupiah (around US$2,000). Party candidates don’t 
need to sign that sort of contract. 
As we can see, electoral campaigns in Indonesia aren’t cheap, not 
even for party candidates. In 2005, the average cost of the winner 
candidacies in regencies and municipalities amounted around US$1.6 
million (Rinakit 2005). Because of this, only the established and 
resourceful political and economic elites can run for Bupati or Walikota 
(Choi 2009).
In addition to the high costs of participate in the local elections, 
there is another factor, in many ways related to this one of the costs, that 
allows local elites to control local political processes. We are referring 
here to the lack of institutionalization of the political parties on the 
local level. In my study of the institutionalization levels of the Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), I observed that even when a party has high 
levels of institutionalization on the national level, as it is the case of 
the PKS, that doesn’t mean that its levels of institutionalization are the 
same on the local level.
Before we descend to the local level, it is important that we take a 
quick look at the history of the party to see the reasons why it can be 
considered one of the most institutionalized parties in Indonesia.
#e embryo of the current PKS, the PK (Partai Keadilan), was born 
a few months after Suharto’s resignation in the democratic e"ervescence 
given by the opening of the political space and the new law on political 
parties (Nº 2/1999). #e Justice Party was funded by a group of young 
Muslim activists with the intention to become the political voice of an 
Islamic movement known as the Tarbiyah (literally means “education” in 
Arabic) movement. #is movement was the evolution of a proselytizing 
Islamic current known as da’wa (dakwah) which propagated Islam 
as an all-encompassing way of life (Hasan 2009). #e da’wa was !rst 
introduced in the Salman Mosque at the Bandung Technological 
Institute (ITB in Indonesian) by an Imam called Imaduddin Abdul 
Rahim, who had learned the teachings from the Muslim Brotherhood 
movement that was born in Egypt and later spread to the Middle East.
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As a political party arisen from a proselytizing movement, the 
PK focused its activities in the recruitment of new members and their 
education in order to ful!ll its ultimate goal of establishing a Muslim 
society in which Islam would govern all aspects of life, from family 
issues to State matters. "e great importance that its members will 
have for the party relates it to what Duverger (1957, 93) called the 
“mass parties” to which “their members are the party’s own matter, the 
substance of its action.”
"is particular aspect is what will di#erentiate the party from the 
majority of parties created right after the fall of the New Order. "e 
rest of the parties were what Duverger would call “cadre parties,” but 
what we would call nowadays “voters or notables parties,” which are the 
ones that focus their activity on the electoral competition rather than 
in the education of their members and followers.
"e importance that the PK gave to its members due to its 
proselytizing character and the fact that it was constituted as a 
vanguard party for a bigger social and religious movement, together 
with its organizational structure based on the usrah (families), the little 
cells used by the Muslim Brotherhood to spread their teachings and to 
recruit new members, makes us think about Lenin and his What is to be 
done? (1902/1988), in which he developed the concept of “democratic 
centralism.” According to this organization formula, the members in 
the cells give up some liberty of action in favor of the center in order 
to gain more e$ciency in the political action of the party as a whole. 
From a strong central core, the party was structured in di#erent regional 
branches that went from the provincial level to the villages (desa), and 
thanks to this, the PK had managed to develop a well-functioning 
network that descended to the grassroots level.
However, all this organizational structure and network didn’t help 
the party to get enough votes (1.36 percent) in the 1999 elections 
to consolidate in the emerging Indonesian party system. In order to 
overcome this adversity, in April 2003, the PK decided to converge 
into the recently created PKS and provide it with all its extensive 
structure so the new party could reach the minimal requirements to 
participate in the 2004 upcoming elections. "e newly created party, 
the PKS, adopted a structure very similar to that of the !rst PK, but 
made the Majelis Syura (Deliberative Assembly) the highest authority 
in the party.
One thing that is quite remarkable about the organization of 
the party and what makes it quite di#erent from most of parties in 
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the Indonesian party system is the existence of the Dewan Syari’ah 
(Shari’a Council). !e presence of this council shows the will of the 
party to claim certain religious authority over its members. It also 
shows that the party goes beyond electoral competition and tries to 
educate its members and guide them through the correct path of the 
Islamic morality. !is is very close related to the vision of the Tarbiyah 
movement which saw Islam as a total way of life: if society is educated 
with the teachings provided by the Qur’an and its positive values are 
put to work through social work and humanitarian actions, this society 
won’t be able to reject Allah’s almighty law, and the establishment of 
an Islamic State ruled by the Shari’a will just be the next natural step.
!e convergence brought also some changes in the ideology of the 
new party. First and foremost, it was the acceptance of the Indonesian 
Republic as a modern nation-state and the Pancasila as the state’s 
philosophy, indirectly rejecting the Jakarta Charter and the seven words 
that made Indonesian Muslims follow the Shari’a. !e PKS opted to 
implement the Medina Charter, the constitution that established the 
city-state of Medina under the Prophet’s leadership which recognized 
all the religious groups of the city and allowed them to coexist peacefully. 
Although the PKS has accepted the nation-state, it still continues to 
introduce the Shari’a as the ruling law of the Indonesian State, not 
from an imposing way, but from the ideological construction that the 
Islamic law is the best way to organize the State (Hasan 2009).
!e PKS had learnt from the mistakes made by the PK and 
moderated its discourse. For the 2004 election, it adopted the slogan 
“Bersih dan Peduli,” “clean and caring,” which enhanced its reputation 
of a party that was away from corruption and, also, showed its concern 
about the precarious economic situation of the lowest social strata. It 
worked well, and the party obtained more than 8 million votes, a 7.34 
percent of the total. Plus, it was the most voted party in the Special 
Region of the Capital city of Jakarta obtaining 22.83 percent of the 
vote, showing its appeal among urban middle classes. !e party became 
the new “rising star,” not only because of the great electoral result, but 
also because it rose as the new voice of political Islam in Indonesia.
!e great results provided the party with a spot in SBY’s new 
presidential cabinet; a new stage of its political life was about to 
start for the party. In this new phase, the PKS had to manage as a 
governmental party, something that is not easy for any party anywhere 
in the world, but even less in Indonesia, where corruption is strongly 
rooted to the State.
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Some corruption cases a!ected the party, but it still was the 
least a!ected of them all. Ideologically, the PKS navigated between 
pragmatism and ideological coherence during the "rst Yudhoyono 
administration, the former taking much more advantage over the latter 
the closer the party was getting to the 2009 elections. One of the biggest 
symbolic actions that showed this shift on the party’s discourse was 
the celebration of the National Working Congress (Mukernas) in Bali 
in February 2008. #e island of Bali is populated by a Hindu majority 
and it had been a PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan, 
or the Indonesian Democratic Party – the Struggle) ground, Megawati 
Sukarnoputri’s party, since the fall of Suharto. Moreover, the island 
had been one of the biggest opponents to the anti-pornography 
bill defended by the PKS at the National Parliament. #e choice of 
celebrating the Congress in Bali wanted to prove, according to Fahri 
Hamzah, that the PKS recognized the plurality and religious, ethnic, 
and cultural diversity of the Indonesian nation (Tomsa 2010).
From a political science point of view, the Bali Congress also 
represented the start of a new path adopted by the party, a path through 
which the party was abandoning its original nature as mass party and 
advancing towards becoming a catch-all party as all the others that 
form the Indonesian party system.
Yet the swift towards pragmatism didn’t have the expected result. 
In the 2009 legislative elections, far from getting the 20 percent of 
the votes and becoming one of the “big three” as the party leaders 
were hoping, the PKS maintained in single digits and barely increased 
its votes (7.9 percent). Despite these poor results, in the II National 
Congress (2010), the party decided to stick to this openness strategy. As 
Hilmi Aminuddin, the Majelis Syura Chairman, announced, after the 
consolidating years where certain exclusivity was necessary to develop 
the party’s character and personality, it was time to start to open in 
order “to build this State with all the components of the nation.”
In the second Yudhoyono administration, the PKS continued to 
be a member of the governmental coalition and it again held several 
cabinet seats. However, its second adventure in power ended with a 
huge graft scandal that not only put its “clean” reputation into question, 
but also its Islamic moral and values.10 Despite that, the PKS seems 
to have found its place in the Indonesian political spectrum, and in 
the most recent legislative elections of April 2014, it has obtained 
6.8 percent of the people’s vote (Pemilu 2014). Although this result 
represents a small loss of the voters’ support, it also tells us that the 
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party has maintained a solid base of around 7 percent of the national 
vote for ten years and three successive elections (2004, 2009, and 2014).
To analyze the party’s level of institutionalization, taking into 
consideration the environmental variable of the decentralization, I 
used Randall and Sväsand’s (2002) model for the analysis of party 
institutionalization in new democracies, and I adapted the indicators 
so it could be explanatory when analyzing the party’s functioning on 
the local level. !e model is summarized in the below (table 1):
Dimensions Indicators
Internal
Systemness
Selection mechanism of the 
running candidates and the role 
of the headquarters in such 
mechanism
Value Infusion
Selection criteria for the 
candidates and for the creation 
of coalitions
External
Decisional Autonomy
Political program and political 
agenda of the candidates
Normalization
Treatment given to the 
candidacies by the mass media 
during the campaigns11
 
Table 1. Indicators for the analysis of the impact of the decentralization on the process 
of party institutionalization.12 Author’s compilation.
!e PKS has a homogeneous candidate selection mechanism 
which reduces the autonomy of the local branches in choosing their 
candidate because it is the center that controls the whole process 
showing great levels of interdependence among the three levels 
(central, provincial, and local). !e local branch proposes a candidate 
to the Regional Council in the province; this validates the candidacy 
which is "nally sent to the Executive Council in Jakarta in search for 
approval.13 All this indicates that when it comes to the Systemness 
dimension, the party maintains its high levels of institutionalization 
both at the national and on the local levels.
!e Value Infusion dimension, though, is another matter. 
Pragmatism becomes the number one criteria in candidate selection 
and coalition formation, being of special relevance because of the low 
vote register at the local legislative elections, the PKS can hardly ever 
present its own candidate. According to Agus Purnomo (2010), a PKS 
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Member of Parliament, who for a while had been in charge of the 
relationship between the party in Jakarta and its regional branches, 
“there are no limits for the formation of coalitions.” When he tried to 
illustrate this, he used the coalitions formed in Central Java between 
the PKS and the PDI-P. Purnomo said that even though the PDI-P 
was considered “more leftist and us [the PKS] more centrist,” they 
still shared some principles regarding the prosperity of society. Also, 
he mentioned that Central Java was mostly a rural region and that the 
PDI-P had strong support among the peasant community. At the same 
time, since the PKS occupied the chair at the top of the Agriculture 
Ministry, and many Bupati would have to deal with that ministry to 
ful!ll the demands of their constituency, it made perfect sense, in a very 
pragmatic approach, to run together in the local executive elections. 
"is means that the party’s moderate Islamist ideology is often put 
aside or even neglected in favor of the popularity and electability of any 
given candidate. As Purnomo (ibid.) put it, “in the !rst place, there are 
the shared principles between the candidate and the party; his abilities 
and his competences; [and then] we have to add the possibilities that 
the candidate has to win the election.” As a consequence of all the above 
mentioned, the Value Infusion dimension of the institutionalization 
process su#ers negative e#ects due to the party’s behavior on the local 
level.
In terms of the Decisional Autonomy dimension, it is important 
to say that a good analysis of the selected indicator for this variable 
would require the observation of all the PKS candidacies in all the 
Pilkada, something that neither this paper, nor my doctoral thesis 
could a#ord to do. However, the !eld work done for the latter provided 
with certain conclusions. Based on the fact that the popularity of the 
possible candidate is the main selection criteria, it is not exactly wrong 
to think that this possible candidate already has an agenda on his/
her own which has given him/her his/her popularity. Moreover, the 
PKS doesn’t have the necessary support in most of the regions to 
present its own candidate so it is quite hard for the party to impose 
its political agenda to any of the candidates in a coalition. In many 
occasions, as Purnomo (ibid.) denounced, “the winning candidates 
have forgotten who supported them.” And even when it has been able 
to choose its own candidate, the PKS has not always chosen a party 
member because they are in most of the occasions too young to have 
the su$cient amount of money to run for the election.14 In contrast 
to what happened “under equal circumstances” on the national level, 
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where the party had a high degree of institutionalization in this 
dimension, it seems that with the introduction of the decentralization 
variable, the Decisional Autonomy is slightly eroded.
Regarding the Normalization dimension, the PKS doesn’t have a 
high degree of institutionalization judging from its performance on 
the local level. Its minimal role in the majority of the coalitions makes 
it di!cult to associate any of its candidates with the party program 
and/or values, which would be the feature that would de"ne the place 
of the party within the Indonesian political spectrum. In this regard, 
it is important to point out a very paradoxical case related to the PKS 
coalitions. In some occasions, the PKS has formed a coalition with 
the PDS (Partai Damai Sejahtera), the biggest Christian party in 
Indonesia. When this has happened, the mass media have brought the 
party to the spotlight, but not in a very positive way. What the Press 
and rest of the media have pointed out is the contradictory character 
of the coalition, something that has situated the PKS in a speci"c place 
of the political spectrum, in the Islamist side, but, at the same time, it 
has highlighted its ideological incoherence (Jakarta Post 2010).
Among many other conclusions, what the study on the PKS tells 
us is that in Indonesia, even the most institutionalized of the parties, 
from a national perspective, as it is the case of the PKS, fails to show 
high levels of institutionalization on the local level. #is opens the door 
for local elites to take over the local political processes and maintain 
their status, and, in some occasions, even create local political dynasties 
in the new democratic context.
ELITIST POLITICS IN INDONESIA’S 
DECENTRALIZED REALITY
Indonesia’s new territorial organization of the State has su$ered several 
transformations since the beginning of the new democratic period. 
It is quite probable that it sees new changes and reviews because it 
has the complicated task of decentralizing State power, services, and 
responsibilities, at the same time that it has to secure one of the nation’s 
ideological principles, the “Unity of Indonesia.” So far, judging from 
the levels of development of Indonesia’s outer islands and the outcome 
of the regional con%icts such as, for instance, the one in Aceh, it seems 
that it has been much more successful in the second task than in the 
"rst one.
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Indonesia has based these center-periphery relationships on 
the economic aspect, developing a subsidized model of territorial 
organization of the State. !is model is a complement of the State’s 
everyday functioning, but it hasn’t been able to produce integration. 
Local political processes seem to run parallel to the national one 
but with very little interaction between them. !ere is very little 
permeability between the two most important levels of power. Yet that 
might be, precisely, the secret for a good articulation of the political 
power in a Unitary State: two strong powers, one on the local level and 
one at the center, this way facilitating the transmission of the decisions 
taken by the highest authority in the country, the President.
It is because of this situation that the "gures of Bupati and Walikota 
take special relevance. Not only are they powerful on the local level 
because the regulation puts them in a dominant position regarding 
their relationship with the local legislatives and because they are the 
ones in charge of a great amount of un-scrutinized economic resources, 
but also because they become almost the only channel through which 
the local and central levels interact. Also, the subsidized nature of the 
decentralization allows the center to maintain its grip on the regions 
and transforms the local executives into lobbying agents in search 
for resources in Jakarta, leaving room for informality and patronage 
practices to sink in, which is what makes it attractive to local elites.
Before this situation, Pilkada reach an extraordinary importance in 
the whole functioning of the State. !e political parties are fully aware 
of that and they place them as their number one priority. However, the 
lack of party institutionalization on the local level—due, "rst, to the 
economic di#culties that the parties su$er and, second, to the huge 
cultural, social, and economic diversity of a country like Indonesia that 
obliges nation-wide parties to adjust their program and discourse to 
very diverse environments—has put local political and economic elites 
in a very interesting spot. !ey are in a good bargaining position before 
the political parties because they can o$er popularity and economic 
assets in exchange for certain electoral facilities and direct access to 
state resources. !is allows them to maintain their power, and on 
several occasions, it even allows them to create political dynasties 
that take over regencies, municipalities, and even provinces.15 Overall, 
we can say that the Pilkada are a transaction between local elites and 
national parties, where pragmatism overrules party ideology or set of 
values, and the personal agenda of a local prominent "gure overrides a 
party’s political program.
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!is transactional pattern and the consequent lack of party 
institutionalization on the local level will continue to happen unless 
the big gap between the national and local political processes is 
reduced. !e little permeability between the two levels prevents 
national parties to su"er drastic consequences when their candidates 
don’t perform correctly or they become involved in corruption cases. 
If the parties were punished electorally on the national level after 
underperforming on the local level, they would try more seriously to 
control their candidates. !ey could, for instance, develop stronger 
local branches from which they could always nominate party cadres 
that would comply with the party program and whose personal agenda 
wouldn’t be that far from the party’s.
Finally, it would be interesting to re#ect on the consequences that 
the maintenance of elitist politics on the local level and the informality 
that they imply can have for the well-functioning of Indonesia as a 
country. !e most dangerous of them could be the arbitrariness in the 
production of results. In other words, the development of a certain 
region will be left to the personal negotiation abilities of the local 
leader of that speci$c region, and also to his/her professionalism and 
political integrity. Since not all the Bupati or Walikota are the same, nor 
they have the same bargaining power in the center, some signi$cant 
disparities between the regions’ level of development can emerge. !is, 
in the long term, can transform into the source of potential con#ict 
between regions and/or between regions and the center, the type of 
con#icts that can present a threat to the State’s unity. In addition, the 
kidnapping of the local political process by the local elites, thanks to 
the weak institutionalization of the political parties in the regions, 
presents another threat regarding political representation. !e model 
of territorial organization, together with the lack of institutionalization 
of the political parties on the local level, has allowed the system, in 
combination with its informal mechanisms, to maintain a signi$cant 
level of governability nationwide while not putting the State’s unity 
in jeopardy, by permitting local elites to have access to the State’s 
resources. Up until now, the system has been more or less working, 
but the big distance between the parties and the grassroots, due to 
the elitist practices on the local level, could generate a crisis of party 
representation that would endanger the still young and, therefore, 
weakly consolidated Indonesian democratic system.
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NOTES
1 This article is an adaptation of the second chapter of my Ph.D. thesis entitled, 
“The Decentralization of Political Power in Indonesia and Its Consequences for 
the Political Parties: 1998–2010. The Case of the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS),” 
presented in Madrid on 29 November 2011, for the 6th International Indonesia Forum 
Conference (August 2013).
2 The Tim Tujuh (Team of Seven) was the experts group in charge of developing the 
basic reforms to initiate Indonesia’s political transition. It was formed by Ryaas 
Rasyid, Andi Mallarangeng, Afan Gaffar, Hamid Awaluddin, Djohermansyah Djohan, 
Ramlan Surbakti, and Anas Urbaningrum.
3 Some literature on this issue: Bertrand 2004; Bünte 2009; and Buehler 2010.
4 Since 2001, this is no longer the case in the Aceh and Papua provinces which, thanks 
to their special status, are in charge of the majority of their income generated by 
their own natural resources (oil, gas, and mining).
5 According to Eckardt and Shah (2006), the percentage in the provinces is slightly 
higher. 
6 We are referring here to the budget allocation of each of the central government 
ministries targeted to improve the regions’ development. Since 2005, these 
allocations are registered in a document called DIPA (Daftar Isian Pelaksanaan 
Anggaran, or Implementation of Budget Allocations List), something that has 
contributed to greater transparency regarding the central government action. 
However, the fact that these allocations aren’t registered in the APBD makes the 
accountability process in the regions difficult.
7 According to what is established in the article 108 of the Law Nº 33/2004, the 
regular development funds should end up becoming DAK, however, this would 
depend on the will of the various sectorial departments, which will see their control 
over the funds reduced if these become part of the regional budget as DAK. In 
2007, the percentage of DAK distributed by the central government was below the 
2.25 percent of the National Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara, or 
APBN) (Eckardt and Shah 2006). 
8 To illustrate this, see Sambijantoro 2013.
9 In an interview with Muhammad Qodari (2010), the Executive Director of Indo 
Barometer (IB), Qodari said: “On the local level, the figure of the Bupati is key. 
It is through this, through his position in government, that the parties develop 
their program. Since they don’t have a well-developed program, one of the few 
things they can present to society during the election period is their government 
performance. If they are out [of the local executive], it is much more difficult for 
them to present an alternative.”
10 A couple of articles on the “beef-gate” corruption scandal: Cochrane 2013; Jakarta 
Post 2013a.
11 The selection of this indicator is due to the fact that, on the local level, there is a 
lack of opinion surveys with the objective of situating the different parties along a 
political spectrum. Due to this lack of surveys, the mass media become the second 
best indicator to analyze this dimension because it is them who have the ability to 
generate, or create, a public opinion in regencies and municipalities.
12 Randall and Sväsand (2002, 12) understand party institutionalization as “the process 
by which the party becomes established in terms both of integrated patterns of 
behavior and of attitudes, or culture.” They distinguish between an internal and an 
external aspect of the process, the former related to the developments happening 
inside the party itself, and the latter related to the relationship between the party 
and “the society in which it is embedded”. And at the same time, in each one of these 
aspects there will be an attitudinal and a structural component, composing a matrix 
of four elements: Systemness (Internal/Structural), which is “the increasing scope, 
density and regularity of the interactions that constitute the party as a structure”; 
Value Infusion (Internal/Attitudinal), which is the party’s “own distinctive culture or 
value-system [that is] an important aspect of party cohesion”; Decisional Autonomy 
(External/Structural), which is the party’s freedom from interference in determining 
its own policies and strategies”; and fourth, Normalization or Reification (External/
Attitudinal), which refers to “the extent to which the party’s existence is established 
in the public imagination.” 
13 Interdependence between its different levels is what characterizes the party’s 
internal relationships. As Pak Zuhrif, a PKS representative in the DPRD of the 
Yogyakarta municipality, commented on an interview conducted in Yogyakarta on 
24 March 2010: “the offices at the regencies and municipalities don’t have direct 
access to the center [the party’s central power, the Dewan Pengurus Pusat], they 
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are subject to the regional councils (DPW, Dewan Pengurus Wilayah), the contact 
is through this DPW.”
14 In the first round of Pilkada that took place between the years 2004 and 2006, the 
PKS only presented two member candidates. In the second round, the ones that 
took place between 2009 and 2011, they presented “maybe 15” (Purnomo 2010).
15 For an illustration of this point, see Jakarta Post 2013b; also, Dami 2013. For more on 
Ratu Atut and her fall, see Amelia and Paath 2013.
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